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Abstract
While a wealth of statutory and auditing pronouncements attest to the importance of the auditing of jour-
nal entries for preventing and detecting material misstatements to financial statements, existing literature
has so far paid inadequate attention to this line of research. To explore this line of research further, this
paper proposes a bipartite model that is based on extreme value theory and Bayesian analysis of Pois-
son distributions. The paper assesses the veracity of the model via a series of experiments on a dataset
that contains the journal entries of an international shipping company for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
Empirical results suggest the model can detect journal entries that have a low probability of occurring
and a monetary amount large enough to cause financial statements to be materially misstated. Further
investigations reveal that the model can assist auditors to form expectations about the journal entries
thus detected as well as update their expectations based on new data. The findings indicate that the
model can be applied for the auditing of journal entries, and thus supplement existing procedures.
Keywords: auditing, journal entries, extreme value theory, Bayesian analysis
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1 Introduction
The area of journal entries is deemed to pose a high risk of material misstatements to financial state-
ments (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 2004); an egregious example is that of
WorldCom who recorded false journal entries to artificially achieve expected revenue growth (Beresford
et al., 2003). The example demonstrates that controls over the processing and recording of journal en-
tries underpin the completeness and timeliness of financial reporting (Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants, 2004). The importance of journal entries is attested by a wealth of auditing standards that
require auditors to test the appropriateness of journal entries recorded in a general ledger (AICPA, 2002)
and (IFAC, 2009).
However, absent a study by Debreceny and Gray (2010), existing literature has so far provided tenu-
ous empirical evidence on how the auditing of journal entries can prevent and detect material misstate-
ments to financial statements (Hogan et al., 2008) and (Grabski, 2010). Further, although literature
suggests numerous procedures for detecting “anomalous” observations (Chandola et al., 2009), these
procedures may not be sufficient for detecting those journal entries that can materially misstate financial
statements.
Motivated by these issues, this paper proposes a bipartite model for detecting “suspicious” journal entries
in order to assist auditors to identify and asses the risk of material misstatement to financial statements.
The paper defines “suspicious” journal entries as having both a large monetary amount and a low proba-
bility of occurring; in other words, “suspicious” journal entries are rare and have a monetary amount that
is large enough to materially misstate financial statements.
The first component of the model employs the peaks-over-threshold method (i.e. POT), a subset of
extreme value theory, to estimate an optimum threshold that can differentiate the distribution of legiti-
mate from that of “suspicious” journal entries. The second component models the number of monthly
“suspicious” journal entries in terms of a univariate Poisson distribution and uses Bayesian analysis to
draw inferences. The Bayesian analysis allows auditors to update their expectations concerning “suspi-
cious” journal entries given new data as well as transfer their knowledge from an audit engagement to
the next.
The paper applies the proposed model to a dataset provided by an international shipping company. The
dataset contains the complete set of the company’s journal entries for fiscal years 2006 and 2007; it was
exported from the the company’s database to a text file that consists of 55,350 lines and eight columns
representing accounting transactions and variables, respectively. Exploratory data analysis has revealed
that the transactions have different distributions between debit and credit balances as well as between
one account category and another. For this reason, the paper combines the two variables, “Debit-Credit”
and “Account Category”, to partition the transactions into twelve experimental cells.
In the following section, the paper sets out the background and reviews procedures for anomaly detec-
tion. Section 3 provides the motivation behind the paper’s using extreme value theory, describes the
data, and introduces the model. Section 4 presents and analyses the results, and Section 5 discusses the
main limitations of the paper. Section 6 draws conclusions and suggests possible directions for further
research.
2 Background and procedures for anomaly detection
2.1 Background
The Statement on Auditing Standards 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
2002) requires auditors, among other things, to test the appropriateness of journal entries recorded in a
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general ledger and other adjustments made in preparing financial statements. The Standing Advisory
Group of the PCAOB (2004) considers journal entries to be an area that poses a high risk of material
misstatement to financial statements due to fraud. Further, controls over the recording and processing
of journal entries underpin the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of financial reporting (Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2004).
The fraud perpetrated at WorldCom exemplifies how journal entries can be manipulated to achieve, albeit
artificially, expected revenue growth. False and unsupported journal entries were recorded to reduce
operating line costs by capitalising these costs and by improperly releasing accruals; these journal entries
had an estimated value of about US$ 7.3 billions (Beresford et al., 2003, p.17 and 56).
Existing literature acknowledges the dearth of empirical evidence on how the reviewing of journal entries
can detect and prevent financial statement fraud (Hogan et al., 2008) and (Grabski, 2010). A noteworthy
exception is a study by Debreceny and Gray (2010) who used Benford’s Law, or digit analysis, to detect
fraudulent journal entries. In essence, the study compared the observed distribution of the first digit of
USD amounts against that expected by Benford’s Law; if the difference was statistically significant under
a chi-square test, then the USD amount was deemed to be fraudulent.
Debreceny and Gray (2010) suggested that the observed distributions were significantly different from
that expected by Benford’s Law for all entities in the sample. Nonetheless, the results may have been
an artefact of the chi-square test, as a large number of observations can induce statistically significant
results (Grabski, 2010). An additional explanation is that either fraudulent journal entries were the norm
in the sample, or Benford’s Law is not applicable to journal entries (Grabski, 2010).
2.2 Procedures for anomaly detection
Although procedures for anomaly and novelty detection abound in the literature, they may not be suf-
ficient for detecting “suspicious” journal entries, because they make restrictive assumptions concerning
data. These procedures can be classified into three broad categories: (i) two-class classification or super-
vised, (ii) one-class classification or semi-supervised, and (iii) unsupervised. An extensive and thorough
review of these procedures can be found in (Bolton and Hand, 2002) and (Chandola et al., 2009).
A two-class classification procedure assumes that a dataset contains observations labelled either as “le-
gitimate” or as “anomalous”. In this case, a model (e.g. neural networks based on supervised learning)
is first trained on the dataset, and then used to determine the class (i.e. “legitimate” or “anomalous” ) to
which a previously unseen observation belongs. Two issues arise: first, the prevalence, or prior probabil-
ity, of “anomalous” observations occurring in the population may be orders of magnitude smaller than
that of the “legitimate” observations; and second, it may be difficult to obtain accurate and representative
class descriptions, especially for the “anomalous” class.
An one-class classification procedure first develops a reference model that can describe the behaviour
of legitimate journal entries. It then estimates a similarity metric (e.g. Euclidean distance) between the
reference model and novel journal entries; the similarity metric is monotonically related to the degree of
suspiciousness. Finally, it considers a journal entry to be “suspicious”, if the journal entry has a similarity
metric in excess of an optimum threshold.
However, an one-class classification is prone to a high false-positive rate. The reason is that, unless it can
encompass all possible instances of legitimate behaviour, it could classify a large number of legitimate
journal entries as being “suspicious”. Further, the status of legitimate behaviour is likely to change
over time, and hence has to be updated as well. Additional shortcomings stem from the uneven sizes
of legitimate and “suspicious” classes as well as the asymmetrical misclassification costs of Type I and
Type II errors.
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An unsupervised approach first estimates the probability density of data and then selects a threshold in
such a way that the probability of a journal entry exceeding the threshold is very small (e.g. P(X > u) =
10−4). A journal entry having such a small probability of occurring is deemed to be “suspicious”.
However, this approach has three main limitations. First, it implicitly assumes that “suspicious” journal
entries, observations occurring beyond the threshold, follow a uniform distribution; this assumption
may be restrictive or invalid in practice (Lee and Roberts, 2008). Second, it has a valid probabilistic
interpretation only for classification tasks whereby a single observation is being compared against a
model describing legitimate behaviour (Clifton et al., 2010). Finally, it does not provide any guidance
on how a threshold should be selected; instead, the threshold is selected in a heuristic manner based on
past experience and knowledge.
The literature review has revealed a lack of knowledge on how the auditing of journal entries can prevent
and detect material misstatements to financial statements. Further, it has indicated that procedures for
anomaly detection may not suffice to detect “suspicious” journal entries. Motivated by these issues, the
paper proposes an alternative model for detecting “suspicious” journal entries that is based on extreme
value theory and Bayesian analysis of Poisson distributions.
A review of extreme value theory lies beyond the scope and confines of the paper; a thorough and
comprehensive treatment of this subject can be found in Embrechts P. (1997), (Coles, 2001), and (Reiss
and Thomas, 2007). At this juncture, it suffices to note that extreme value theory has been applied
extensively in the discipline of Finance. For example, it has been applied to estimate Value-at-Risk
(Longin, 2000) and expected shortfall (McNeil and Frey, 2000), to investigate contagion risk in the
international banking sector (Ong et al., 2007), and to examine risk-based allocation of assets (Bensalah,
2002).
3 Research Design and Methodology
3.1 Motivation
The paper follows (Rohrbach, 1993) to conjecture that “suspicious” journal entries exhibit two distin-
guishing characteristics: they are rare, which means they have a low probability of occurring; and, they
have a monetary amount that is sufficiently large to cause financial statements to be materially misstated.
The corollary of this conjecture is that, if monetary amounts follow a unimodal distribution, then the
amounts that are maxima in magnitude are also minima in probability values, and vice versa; in this case,
these amounts would concentrate in the tail, or extreme-quantiles, of the unimodal distribution.
This insight motivates the paper to employ extreme value theory in order to model “suspicious” journal
entries, as it is the appropriate statistical framework for studying observations that pertain to the tails, or
extreme-quantiles, of a distribution.
3.2 Data description
The dataset has been provided by an international shipping company and consists of their journal entries
for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. The dataset was exported from the database of the company to a text
file that contains 55,350 lines and eight columns representing accounting transactions and variables,
respectively; the variables are described in Table 1. For example, “Account Class” takes thirty values,
such as: “Interest Received”, “Office Expenses”, “Trade Debtors” etc. In the present case, “Account
Category” takes eight values: (i) “Non-Current Assets”, (ii) “Cash and Cash Equivalents”, (iii) “Trade
and Other Receivables”, (iv) “Income”, (v) “Expenses”, (vi) “Current Liabilities”, (vii) “Non-Current
Liabilities”, and (viii) “Equity”.
Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on Information Systems
4
Name Type Values
Account Number Alphanumeric 360
Account Description Text 360
Posting Date Date 24
Debit-Credit Binary 2
USD Amount Numerical
Transaction Details Text
Account Class Categorical-hierarchical 30
Account Category Categorical-hierarchical 8
Table 1: Description of variables
The variables “Account Number”, “Account Class”, and “Account Category” group transactions in an
ascending order of aggregation. For example, the account category “Trade and Other Receivables” con-
sists of 23, 886 transactions; this number represents the aggregation of six account classes: “Sales Taxes
Receivable” (1,410), “Trade Debtors” (6,217), “Other Debtors” (5,634), “Loans Receivable” (164), “In-
surance Receivables” (9,361), and “Other Receivables” (1,100). The number of transactions is shown in
parentheses.
The paper groups the transactions according to the “Account Category” variable, because there are not
enough transactions at lowers levels of aggregation (i.e. “Account Number”, “Account Class”) to es-
timate the parameters of the proposed model. For the same reason, the paper excludes “Non-Current
Assets” and “Equity” completely.
In addition, the paper excludes those transactions auditors would select as a standard procedure in the
normal course of an audit; for example, transactions that record transfers to reserves, year-end consoli-
dation, and closing Profit and Loss items to the Balance Sheet. Although the paper has not investigated
the counter-factual, including these transactions would cause the model to estimate a higher threshold
than otherwise; the reason is this type of transactions tends to have large monetary amounts and occur
infrequently, often at the end of a fiscal year. As a result, the model would select transactions, which are
selected anyway, but ignore transactions that may warrant further investigation.
Exploratory data analysis suggests the distributions of transactions are different between one account
category and another as well as between debit and credit balances. As a result, the paper combines the two
variables, “Debit-Credit” and “Account Category”, to partition the transactions into twelve experimental
cells, as shown in Table 2.
Account Category N Mean Mode Median Var
USD:Credit
Cash and Cash Equivalents 432 -2,449 -26 -215 13,424,043
Trade and Other Receivables 12,322 -2,879 -1,052 -1,053 14,819,048
Income 5,567 -1,081 0 -422 2,348,775
Expenses 860 -757 -11 -187 2,304,802
Current Liabilities 11,087 -1,270 -203 -272 5,604,960
Non-Current Liabilities 143 -1,228 -2,677 -624 2,974,177
30,411
USD:Debit
Cash and Cash Equivalents 2,655 6,154 1,274 4,168 29,997,396
Trade and Other Receivables 11,564 2,985 1,052 1,188 16,255,837
Income 1,663 1,225 0 441 4,944,962
Expenses 4,162 614 10 72 2,806,104
Current Liabilities 4,763 968 203 293 3,751,541
Non-Current Liabilities 89 2,000 109 735 9,538,657
24,896
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for fiscal years 2006 and 2007
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3.3 Modelling “suspicious” transactions using the peaks-over-threshold method
In order to introduce the peaks-over-threshold method, the paper uses a concrete example that is based
on the results and depicted in Fig. 1.
To elaborate, let variable X = (x1, . . . , xn) denote the monetary amounts of the transactions belonging
to the “Debit” side of “Trade and Other Receivables”, where n = 11,564 representing the number of
transactions. Variable X can be assumed to be an independent and identically distributed (i.e. iid) random
variable that follows an unknown distribution. The distribution is unimodal, and hence its probability
density function decreases monotonically with increasing distance from the single mode, as shown in
Fig. 1a.
Consequently, the further from the mode a monetary amount is, the larger its magnitude and the lower its
probability of occurring would be. In other words, transactions that are extreme in monetary amounts are
also minima in probability density; the converse is also true. This insight motivates the paper to estimate
an optimum threshold, u, that can differentiate the distribution of legitimate from that of “suspicious”
transactions. Transactions whose monetary amounts exceed the optimum threshold are considered to be
“suspicious”, because these amounts are both rare and large.
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For a sufficiently high threshold, u, Pickand’s theorem (Pickands, 1975) describes the distribution of
excesses over threshold u conditional on the threshold being exceeded, i.e. (X −u |X > u), in terms of a
distribution within the Generalized Pareto (GP) family, as follows (Coles, 2001, p.75):
F (x−u; σ˜, ξ) =
 1−
[
1 + ξ
(
x−u
σ˜
)] −1
ξ
+
if ξ , 0,
1− exp
[
− x−uσ˜
]
if ξ = 0.
(1)
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The distribution, Eq. 1, has the following probability density function:
f (x−u; σ˜, ξ) =

(
1
σ˜
) [
1 + ξ
(
x−u
σ˜
)] −1−ξ
ξ
+
if ξ , 0,(
1
σ˜
)
exp
[
− x−uσ˜
]
if ξ = 0.
(2)
Where x−u > 0, σ˜ > 0, and σ˜, ξ stand for the scale and the shape of a GP distribution, respectively. The
shape parameter, ξ, describes the tail of a GP distribution; if ξ < 0 then the distribution of excesses, x−u,
has an upper bound at u− σ˜ξ , which means that the probability density for x > u− σ˜ξ is zero; if ξ > 0 then
the distribution decreases polynomially and has a lower bound at u− σ˜ξ ; and if ξ = 0 then the distribution
decreases exponentially and has no lower nor upper bound.
Selecting a threshold that is sufficiently high so that Pickand’s theorem could apply is fraught with
difficulties (Embrechts P., 1997, p. 355). Suffice it to note that a threshold strikes a trade-off between
bias and variance in a model. A too low threshold could lead to sampling from the main body of a
distribution, non-extremal values, and thus induce bias in estimating the parameters of a model. On the
other hand, as a threshold increases the number of excesses with which parameters can be estimated
decreases, and hence the standard errors of the parameters would increase.
In order to estimate an optimum threshold, the paper follows a three-step approach for each of the twelve
experimental cells, described in Table 2. First, the paper initialises a set of candidate thresholds that
take values between the 95% and 99% percentiles of the amounts. Second, at each candidate threshold,
the paper fits a GP distribution, Eq. 1, and estimates the parameters, θ = (σ˜, ξ), by maximising the
log-likelihood function (Coles, 2001, p.80):
LL (σ˜, ξ; x−u) =
 −Nlog (σ˜)−
(1+ξ
ξ
)∑N
i=1 log
[
1 + ξ
(
xi−u
σ˜
)]
+
if ξ , 0,
−Nlog (σ˜)− 1σ˜
∑N
i=1 (xi−u) if ξ = 0.
(3)
Where N denotes the number of excesses over threshold u. Finally, the paper selects the threshold that
corresponds to the GP distribution having the maximum log-likelihood.
This threshold becomes the decision boundary that distinguishes legitimate from “suspicious” trans-
actions. For example, Fig.1b depicts the threshold, u = 15,161 USD, that separates legitimate from
“suspicious” transactions; in this example, there are 11,348 legitimate and 216 “suspicious” transac-
tions.
3.4 Bayesian analysis of Poisson distributions
The paper models the number of monthly “suspicious” transactions in terms of a univariate Poisson
distribution and draws inference via the Bayes’ rule. Let the observed number of monthly “suspicious”
transactions be denoted by the discrete variable V that follows a Poisson distribution having a probability
mass function Pr(V = v) = λ
ve−λ
v! , where λ > 0 and v > 0.
Let λ be the unobserved and unknown average number of “suspicious” transactions over the 24-month
period under investigation; and, let the prior distribution of λ, p(λ), denote the degree of certainty, or
inductive bias, about λ in the absence of any observed evidence.
The probability of a “suspicious” transaction occurring is assumed to depend on λ. This dependence can
be formalised as p(V |λ), which is the conditional probability of the observed number of “suspicious”
transactions for each possible value of λ; it is also termed the likelihood function of λ, L(λ). The Bayes’
rule combines prior probability and likelihood function to estimate the conditional probability, p(λ|V),
for different values of λ taking into account observed evidence, V .
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Formally, the Bayes’ rule states:
p(λ|V) = p(V |λ) p(λ)∑
λ p(V |λ) p(λ) , Posterior =
Likelihood x Prior
Marginalising factor
. (4)
The likelihood function of λ is given by: p(V |λ) = ∏mi=1 λvi e−λvi! , where vi represents the number of “suspi-
cious” transactions for the ith month and m = 24 reflects the number of months.
The paper chooses the Gamma distribution as a conjugate prior, λ ∼ Gamma(α,β), and sets the hyper-
parameters equal to one, α = β = 1, for the prior to be non-informative. Because of the conjugacy
property, the posterior distribution of the Poisson parameter follows a Gamma distribution as well: λ|V ∼
Gamma(
∑m
i=1 vi +α, β+ m).
The posterior distribution has a closed-form solution, as follows:
p(λ|V) = β˜
α˜λ α˜−1 exp(−β˜λ)
Γ(α˜)
, (5)
where α˜ =
∑m
i=1 vi +α, β˜ = β+ m, and Γ(α˜) = (α˜−1)! is the Gamma function of α˜.
4 Results presentation and discussion
4.1 Modelling “suspicious” transactions
The results, summarised in Table 3, identify the parameters of the best-fitted GP model, the thresholds,
u, and the number of “suspicious” transactions, N(u). For example, one hundred GP models at varying
thresholds are fitted to the transactions that belong to the “Debit” side of “Trade and Other Receivables”.
The best-fitted GP model occurs when the threshold is USD 15,161, and hence 216 transactions are
considered to be “suspicious”, as depicted in Fig. 1b.
Gener. Pareto Distribution
Account Category N N(u) % u Shape Scale N.Log.Likel.
USD:Credit
Cash and Cash Equivalents 432 5 1.16% -13,551 -1.421 0.300 -17.549
Trade and Other Receivables 12,322 554 4.5% -12,695 -0.562 0.325 -379.392
Income 5,567 11 0.19% -12,821 1.635 0.003 -34.214
Expenses 860 2 0.23% -11,627 -4.399 6.151 -25.513
Current Liabilities 11,087 23 0.21% -13,629 1.524 0.021 -31.134
Non-Current Liabilities 143 27 18.88% -2,677 4.560 0.000 -100.799
30,411 622 2.04%
USD:Debit
Cash and Cash Equivalents 2,655 225 8.47% 15,137 -0.98 0.43 -184.75
Trade and Other Receivables 11,564 216 1.86% 15,161 -0.51 0.34 -129.32
Income 1,663 23 1.38% 12,811 1.47 0.01 -51.24
Expenses 4,162 3 0.07% 15,657 -2.21 1.21 -20.42
Current Liabilities 4,763 8 0.17% 16,366 -1.75 0.64 -22.32
Non-Current Liabilities 89 2 2.25% 11,482 -3.65 4.44 -24.37
24,896 477 1.91%
Table 3: Generalized Pareto models
The results suggest the proposed model can perform more efficiently than simply selecting the largest x%
(e.g. 5%) of the amounts. For example, the thresholds estimated for the debit and credit sides of “Trade
and Other Receivables” select about 1.86% and 4.5% of the corresponding transactions, respectively.
The reason for this efficiency is the model can estimate a threshold that is a function of three variables:
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(i) “USD Amount”, (ii) “Debit-Credit”, and (iii) “Account Category”. On the other hand, a uniform
threshold is a function of only “USD Amount”.
The proposed model can estimate a threshold that, at least in principle, can be interpreted in the context
of extreme value theory, whereas a heuristic threshold lacks any interpretation. In this respect, the model
can mitigate the subjectivity and bias that may occur when auditors select a threshold only on the basis of
their past experience and knowledge (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and (Trotman et al., 2011).
4.2 Bayesian analysis
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Figure 2: Bayesian analysis for Trade and Other Receivables - Debit side
Figure 2 depicts the Bayesian analysis of the monthly “suspicious” transactions that belong to the “Debit”
side of “Trade and Other Receivables”. The maximum a posteriori (MAP), the mode of the posterior dis-
tribution, denotes the number of monthly “suspicious” transactions, λ= 9, that has the highest probability
of occurring. Further, the MAP has a 95% credible interval of 8−10, which means that, given the data,
there is a 95% probability that the number of monthly “suspicious” transactions is either 8, or 9, or 10.
In this case, the MAP is the same as the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE), which is the average
calculated form the data (i.e. 216 “suspicious” transactions / 24 months). The reason is the posterior
distribution is estimated only on the basis of the data, as the prior probability has been chosen to be
non-informative.
Auditors can apply the Bayesian analysis in two ways. First, they can select those monthly transactions
that have the 8− 10 largest monetary amounts, provided the monetary amounts follow a unimodal dis-
tribution. Second, they can update their evidence sequentially, as the current posterior distribution will
become the prior distribution in next year’s audit.
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5 Caveats and limitations
In the context of this paper, the monetary amounts follow a unimodal distribution, and hence those trans-
actions that are extreme in monetary amounts are also minima in probability density values. However, if
the monetary amounts follow a multimodal distribution, then the correspondence between large amounts
and low probability does not hold, because there is not a single mode from which distances can be de-
fined. This possibility limits the applicability and veracity of the results. Nonetheless, this limitation is
not irredeemable, as a future study could extend the paper to multimodal distributions by employing an
appropriate methodology; for example, Clifton et al. (2010) describe such methodology.
The paper proposes a model that does not include two variables that are important in an audit engagement:
time, and audit risk. In particular, the model is static in that it derives a time-invariant threshold, as shown
in Fig. 1b. However, it may not be realistic to use a constant threshold throughout a fiscal year, because
there is much more scope for manipulating journal entries at year-end than there is during the rest of the
year. Ongoing research examines how a temporal covariate can incorporate information about cycles and
trends that may be present in the distribution of journal entries.
Further, the model does not take into account the concept of audit risk, as it implicitly assumes that all
audit engagements pose the same level of audit risk. An extension to the model could include auditors’
assessment of audit risk and its components (i.e. inherent, detection, control). For example, an audit
engagement having a high inherent risk would be assigned a much lower threshold than otherwise, other
things being equal.
6 Conclusions and directions for future research
Existing literature, absent a study by Debreceny and Gray (2010), has so far provided little empirical
evidence on how the auditing of journal entries can prevent and detect material misstatements to financial
statements. The lack of evidence becomes more pronounced, given that a wealth of auditing standards
require auditors to consider the complete set of journal entries in planning and performing audits. The
auditing of journal entries becomes problematic considering that established procedures for anomaly
detection may not suffice for detecting those journal entries that may cause financial statements to be
materially misstated. Motivated by these issues, the paper proposes a bipartite model in order to assist
auditors to detect such journal entries.
The results suggest the model can detect journal entries that are both rare and have a monetary amount
large enough to materially misstate financial statements. Further, the Bayesian analysis indicate how
auditors can form as well as update expectations about “suspicious” journal entries.
The paper has raised some questions that may support additional research. Ongoing research aims at
incorporating a temporal covariate for the model to estimate a threshold that can capture potential cycles
and trends existing in the distribution of journal entries; a further extension to the model could include a
covariate for auditors’ assessment of audit risk. An additional study could compare the performance of
the model against that of unaided auditors who rely only on their past experience and knowledge.
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